Becoming a self in Religiousness A in contrast to Becoing a Self in Religiousness B

Seung-Goo Lee, Ph. D.

Professor of Systematic Theology

Kukje theological Seminary

In this paper I shall consider the understanding of becoming oneself of the person in Religiousness A. The Christian's understanding of becoming a self has certain characteristics which are different from the ethical person's understanding. The fundamental difference comes from their relation to God in regard to their becoming themselves. Whereas the ethical person does not need God in this matter, the Christian thinks that without God there is no self. In relation to this, one interesting question may be raised: how should we think about the understanding of becoming a self of the person who is in Religiousness A? This is interesting because Religiousness A is, on the one hand, quite compatible with the ethical sphere, but, on the other, in relation to the problem of becoming a self the person in Religiousness A thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to God. Does this mean that in relation to the problem of becoming a self, the person in Religiousness A has the same view as the Christian has? Or does the person in Religiousness A have a different understanding of the expression "one can be oneself only in relation to God"? If the latter is the case, exactly what constitutes the difference between the Christian's understanding of the phrase "only in relation to God" and the way it is understood by the person in Religiousness A?

      I wish to show in this paper that the basic difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in Religiousness A lies in the characteristics of God to whom each relates in his relation to himself. In other words, the God of the Christian (or the Christian conception of God) is different from the God of Religiousness A (or the conception of God in Religiousness A), and this difference plays the major role in defining the difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in Religiousness A. We shall also see the difference between their views of one's relationship to God, and the difference between guilt-consciousness which the person in Religiousness A has and sin-consciousness which the Christian has. In the end, we shall see that as long as one keeps the characteristics of the ethical sphere, one's understanding of becoming a self is far from the Christian understanding.  For, as we have seen, the Christian's relation to God, which is vital for his becoming himself, is regarded by the ethical person and the person in Religiousness A as being particularistic, anti-rationalistic, and heteronomous. (But, as we have seen, this does not mean that the Christian himself also thinks that his relation to God has these characteristics.  According to the Christian himself, one's relation to God is the most important thing which is demanded by God from everybody, and which allows one's real freedom.)

     Before proceeding to the main argument of this paper, it will be useful to make it clear here what I mean by Religiousness A. This explanation is necessary, because there are some ambiguities in Kierkegaard's use of this term.[1] I think that Kierkegaard applies this term to two somewhat different types of religiousness. (When I say "somewhat different types of religiousness" I do not disregard the fact that in the mind of Kierkegaard, in the final analysis, both of them have the same characteristic of immanentism, or of paganism.) He sometimes calls the religiousness of the subjective thinkers who are not Christians, Religiousness A. For example, if there is a religiousness which is compatible with and suitable to Socrates, that religiousness is Religiousness A. For, as Taylor says, "Kierkegaard most frequently uses Socrates as an example of a person who represents religion A...."[2] Thus, Dupre even calls Religiousness A "Socratic religion"[3], and Roberts speaks of the Socratic position as a "paradigm of religious teaching" which is contrasted with Christianity.[4] Perhaps, as some people think, the religiousness of Schleiermacher is regarded by Kierkegaard as Religiousness A.[5] On the other hand, Kierkegaard at times calls the religiousness of the person who lives in Christendom but does not have the Christian mode of existence, Religiousness A. In other words, in some places Kierkegaard regards nominal Christians as people in Religiousness A.[6] What Kierkegaard calls “the childish Christianity” in the Postscript is Religiousness A in this sense.[7] In Judge For Yourself Kierkegaard calls it “professorial-scholarly Christianity.”[8] In Christian Discourses Kierkegaard calls it more bluntly “paganism”: “Christianity is regarded as a sum of doctrines; lectures are given on it on the same way as on ancient philosophy, Hebrew, or any branch of knowledge whatever, with the listener’s or the learner’s relation to it left as a matter of indifference. Basically this is paganism.”(Chr. D, pp. 214f., emphasis is given) This is the reason why Kierkegaard mournfully laments over the “whole mirage [or blinding illusion] of Christendom,” “the most dangerous of all illusions.”(Chr. D, p. 229) Kierkegaard says even in this way: “Christianity has reached the point where it must be said: So now I am going to begin all over again from the beginning.”[9] In such a situation, “[a] person’s life is essentially homogeneous with the secular mentality and this world.”(JFY, p. 194) Hence, according to Kierkegaard, there are “the pagans” in the Christendom. “There may be quite a number of true Christians in Christendom, but every such one is also militant.” (Chr. D, p. 228) And “the pagans who are found in Christendom have sunk the lowest…. The pagans in Christendom have sunk below paganism. The former [those in the real pagan countries] belong to the fallen race; the latter, after having been lifted up, have fallen once again and have fallen even lower.”(Chr. D, p. 12)

     When I refer to Religiousness A in this paper, however, I mainly mean the Religiousness A in its former sense. Hence the main task of this paper is to examine the understanding of becoming a self of the person in Religiousness A in this sense. This examination naturally leads us to compare it to that of the merely ethical person and that of the Christian. Based upon this examination, we shall conclude that the understanding of becoming a self of the person in Religiousness A may be regarded as a continuation or enhancement of the understanding of becoming a self of the ethical person, and that in this respect, his understanding is also very different from the Christian's understanding. 

     I think we can reach this conclusion by showing that, for Religiousness A, God is understood as an immanent God, who is only immanently in the natural world, whereas Christianity is dependent on revelation which is given by the transcendent God. To demonstrate the understanding of God of the person in Religiousness A, (1) we shall consider the view that it is possible to think of the God of the first part of The Sickness unto Death as God in general, not necessarily the God of Christianity. (2) Then we shall relate this kind of religiousness to the "Socratic" in the works of Climacus. (3) We may then look at Schleiermacher in order to understand better what Religiousness A may be and why it is so different from what Kierkegaard understands by Christianity. That is, Schleiermacher may help us to understand better what a fully fledged Religiousness A might look like.

(1)

Let us start with the discussion of The Sickness unto Death. Some interpreters of Kierkegaard think that as far as the first part of The Sickness unto Death is concerned, it can provide us with a good example of the thinking of the person in Religiousness A in the matter of becoming a self. Although I wonder whether it is really possible to separate this part from the rest of the book, and whether the God of this part is also the God of Christianity, I think it is interesting to reflect on this possibility. Let us suppose for a moment that this is possible, and try to draw out the understanding of becoming a self from this perspective.[10]

      For those who think in the way which I have described in the above paragraph, the description of becoming a self and of despair does not include any Christological consideration; it has, if we may say so, only a unitarian (in the broad sense) picture of God. And in this part, God must always be understood as one who has nothing to do with the Incarnation in the traditional sense of the word.[11] Rather, one may say that the God of this picture does not need any incarnation, and actually cannot become incarnate. In this part, according to this view, one is understood to be oneself only in relation to this kind of God. Hampson says: "The self comes to itself essentially for the first time in relationship to God...Apart from God the self would not be itself. God 'constitutes' the self."[12] For, says she again: "[A] human was intended to become himself or herself in relationship to God."[13] In this respect, the person in Religiousness A is different from the merely ethical person who thinks that one can be oneself by oneself without any relation to God. In contrast to the ethical person's independence, the person in Religiousness A is dependent on some deity. But at the same time, in contrast to the Christian, the person in Religiousness A cannot relate to the Christian God who has become incarnate himself as an individual human being without ceasing to be God.

(2)

Now let us turn to "the Socratic" in the writings of Climacus. Socrates' religiousness, if there is any religiousness in Socrates, has this very characteristic of Religiousness A. That is, the type of religion which would be compatible with the Socratic thought, as explained in Philosophical Fragments, could only be Religiousness A. Socrates is at the very least the subjective thinker (outside of Christianity) who emphasizes the task of existing as an individual.[14] He has his "God-relationship".[15] But, as Climacus say, "[in] Religiousness A there is no historical point of departure. Only in the realm of time does the individual discover in time that he must presuppose himself to be eternal.... In time, the individual reflects upon his being eternal."(CUP, p. 773) 

      Here, in relation to this, one may make two major points: one is concerned with the character of God in Religiousness A, and the other is concerned with the nature of one's relation to God in Religiousness A. But these two points are closely related to one another. That is the reason why we can talk about his conception of God. The first point concerned with the character of God is that in Religiousness A, "in immanence God is neither a something ..., nor outside the individual...."(CUP, p. 561) For in Religiousness A God is "all and infinitely all" (so He is not something), and He is also in the individual. The God of Religiousness A cannot be thought of outside one's relation to Him. And therefore, the second point is that in Religiousness A, the individual finds the God-relationship within himself.[16] Thus, "every individual is essentially structured equally eternally and essentially related to the eternal."(CUP, p. 573)

     Because of these characteristics of Religiousness A, for the person in Religiousness A, there is no need of the divine teacher, for the teacher is merely an occasion for discovering one's own eternity. Kierkegaard draws out this conclusion from the Socratic doctrine of recollection which is expressed in Meno, and says:

[According to this doctrine of recollection] the Truth is not introduced into [the individual from without], but was within him. [This thought receives further development at the hands of Socrates...].(PF, p. 9)

In the thought of Socrates, the idea that one has the truth within oneself is based on the belief that one has an essential infinite within oneself. So according to the person in Religiousness A, the self is made up of an infinite aspect and constantly changing temporal experiences.[17] This infinite within us is the agent which makes the relationship between God and man possible. As far as man has this infinity, he himself can establish the relationship to God. The connection with the Eternal is "part of the self's constitution."[18] So one may even say, with Manheimer, that "Socrates orients the individual to his own inward divinity."[19]

      Hence there is a sort of continuity between God and the infinite within human being.  The infinite within us, as Taylor says, is the "point of contact" between the self and... God."[20] As far as the infinite within us is concerned, there is no problem at all for the human being. But the trouble is that one is in the temporal realm. So there is a tension between one's essential eternity and one's staying in the temporal realm. Coming to be in the temporal world gives the human being this trouble and tension. By coming to be temporal, one has forgotten one's eternal essential nature and the essential relationship between God and man. However, though hindered by the fact of temporal existence, one has, within oneself, the possibility of remembering one's eternal nature (to use the mythical word), or of establishing one's relationship to God. To put it otherwise, in spite of the obstacle of the temporal element, the bond between the human being and the Eternal, or God, is still there to be discovered. 

     Therefore, for those who continue in the Socratic religiousness, it is nonsensical that God, the Eternal, should become incarnate as an individual human being. First of all, there is no need at all for God to become incarnate.  There is no need for a mediator; one can be related to God "without passing through a mediator."[21] For, as we have seen, one can, by oneself, make the relationship to God. Or, it would be better to say that one has already this God-relationship within oneself.[22] So there is no need of God becoming incarnate in order to be the Saviour and Teacher of man.(cf. PF, p. 47) Secondly, therefore, the idea that God has become incarnate becomes the object of mockery for the person in Religiousness A.  According to him, this idea of the Incarnation is a distortion of the idea of eternal God. For, according to him, if God has become incarnate as an individual human being, then God is no longer eternal; from now on God must be temporal in sensu strictu. So the idea of the Incarnation, for the person in Religiousness A, is the mockery of the Godhead and blasphemy. God cannot be a human being, and cannot be anthropomorphic. 

     Therefore, we can see that although they assert that one can be oneself only in relation to God, they themselves have already defined who God must be. Those who hold to the Socratic religiousness have a relation to God, but their God is the one who is defined by their conception of God. For the God of Religiousness A, as Shestov says, "not everything is possible, and ... the possible and the impossible are determined, not by God, but by eternal laws to which God and man are equally subject." "For this reason," continues Shestov, "[this kind of] God has no power over history, i. e., over reality."[23] Or, in a sense, one may say that in Religiousness A what is important is the relationship itself, not the exact object to which one relates. "Religiousness A," says Climacus, "is the dialectic of inward deepening; it is the relation to the eternal happiness that is not conditioned by a something but is the dialectical inward deepening of the relation, which is dialectical."(CUP, p. 556) This religiousness has led to greater inwardness and passionate subjectivity.

     In order to see these points more clearly, I want to draw out several  characteristics of Religiousness A from  Part Two, chapter IV ("The Problem of the  Fragments "), section II, A ("Existential Pathos") of the Postscript, in the following few paragraphs. The examination of this part needs a very critical reading, for even though this part is mainly concerned with Religiousness A, Climacus, in the course of his discussion of Religiousness A, sometimes talks about the paradoxical religiousness (i. e., Christianity) as well.[24] Hence we need some means by which we can sever Religiousness A from religiousness B and make the difference clear. In this part Climacus discusses the three expressions for existential pathos: (1) absolute relation to the absolute telos as the initial expression, (2) suffering as the essential expression, and (3) guilt as the decisive expression. In the following discussion, I shall examine the aspects that are solely valid for Religiousness A. From this perspective, I shall discuss these expressions in turn.

      In regard to the first of these (i. e., one's absolute relation to the absolute telos), we can say that in Religiousness A, one's relation to the absolute telos is expressed in one's resignation. So the first characteristic of Religiousness A is resignation. Climacus emphasizes that one's resignation must be total; one should relinquish all rights to everything external and immediate. Here a "total renunciation" is the expression of the enthusiastic reconciliation to the infinite. As we have seen in our discussion of Fear and Trembling, this infinite resignation, as opposed to faith, is a movement that everybody is able to make in his own strength of will, i. e., an immanent movement.[25] The monastic movement of the Middle Ages is provided by Climacus as a classic example of this. But what he says of the monastic movement applies not only to that of the Middle Ages, but also to general religious monasticism.[26] Compared with Hegelian mediation, the monastic movement has passion, at the very least.[27] It tries to resign the relative and the immediate and in this resignation one expresses one's sincere devotion to the Absolute. But the trouble with the monastic movement lies in the fact that it makes one's relationship to the Absolute something outwardly and externally special and peculiar.(Cf. CUP, pp. 409, 413).

      So what is finally suggested as a true form of resignation is not even something like the monastic movement.[28] What Climacus demands as the first characteristic of Religiousness A is what may be called "religiousness as incognito", the hidden inwardness which does not express itself at all. Reacting against the suspicious inwardness of the monastic movement, Climacus is therefore taking the opposite extreme view of hidden inwardness. It is clear that this "religiousness with humor as its incognito is still not Christian religiousness.... it still continually constricts itself within immanence ...."(CUP, p. 532) Anti-Climacus, the pseudonymous author of Practice in Christianity regards such totally "hidden inwardness" as one of the symptoms of established Christendom and scathingly criticizes it.[29] Thus hidden inwardness is only the willingness to sacrifice any and every finite thing for the sake of the Absolute.(JP, IV, 3837(Pap. XI 3 B 45)) According to Kierkegaard, Mynster is the representative of those who emphasize this hidden inwardness.[30]

     This hidden God-relationship is clearly contrasted to Kierkegaard's Christian understanding of God-relationship (which is summarized in his assertion that "an authentic God-relationship cannot avoid leaving its visible mark upon a man."[31]) From this perspective, Kierkegaard criticizes the totally hidden inwardness:

The mistake of the religiousness of our time is that faith has been made into 'inwardness' in such a degree that in reality it has completely gone out. Directly or indirectly, life has been permitted to take on a purely worldly character....[32]

So he says: "Hidden inwardness. That is what must be rejected... And nothing is more contrary to Christianity, Christianity which, above all, wishes everything to be made manifest."(Journals, No. 1226(Pap. X 4 A 327)) He says again:

If I transform my Christianity into merely hidden inwardness and outwardly conform completely to the world, if I give absolutely no indication that in my inmost being I acknowledge a completely different criterion (the God-relationship), but am an upright man just like most people etc., then it is obviously a betrayal. (JP, II, 2119(Pap. VIII 1 A 511), emphasis is given)

Hence we can agree with Fabro when, after examining Kierkegaard's various writings, he says: "It would be impossible to enumerate the sections and the pages of his works and the innumerable passages of the Journals in which Kierkegaard denounces the hypocrisy of 'secret inwardness'...."[33] 

      In contrast to this, from the perspective of Religiousness A, what is expressed outwardly, whatever it may be, is despised as something inferior to a completely hidden inwardness. This hidden inwardness is the first characteristic of the pathos of Religiousness A.[34] In Religiousness A, what is religious must be only in the realm of inwardness; it must not be expressed in the outward way. Outwardly he must be just like a person in the ethical sphere. His religion does not affect his outward life, his ethics etc. Insofar as one has this inwardness which cannot be expressed in the outward way, one is in Religiousness A.

      Let us turn to the second characteristic of Religiousness A. The essential expression for the existential pathos is suggested by Climacus to be "suffering".(CUP, p, p. 433) In Religiousness A, suffering must be absolutely inward suffering. Religious suffering is not to be identified with the suffering that comes about through misfortune. So from this perspective, it is wrong to think of external suffering as religious suffering. Climacus, from this perspective, criticizes the New Testament notion of suffering, for someone like Paul suffered externally and Peter speaks of external suffering which comes to the Christians because of their faith. As far as they think of external suffering, their suffering cannot be religious, even though they suffer because of their faith. "No," says Climacus, "when the individual is secure in his relationship with God and suffers only in the external, this is not religious suffering."(CUP, p. 453) What then is the religious suffering of which Climacus speaks? Only when one is not sure of his God-relationship, is there inner suffering, religious suffering. From this perspective, the Christian who is sure of his God-relationship and abandons everything and suffers from all kinds of persecution and even martyrdom is still not religious enough. The person in Religiousness A would say that the Christian is too secure and he is too sure of his God-relationship. For, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian should have "an unshakable sureness, an unshakable certainty about one's relationship to God."[35] 

      Therefore, Religiousness A's understanding of religious suffering as completely inner suffering is different from the Christian understanding of suffering which we have discussed in the first chapter. As we have seen, the characteristic Christian suffering is suffering for the sake of one's Christian faith and its expression as love and discipleship.  Kierkegaard says:

[Every] person is required to witness to the truth with his life, and please note, not in an illusory way, such as by becoming a pastor (office, paid occupation) but by supporting the truth. If one does this, then genuine Christian suffering will also come.(JP, II, 1385(Pap. X 1 A 64))

In short, Christian suffering is suffering "for the [Christian] doctrine."[36] And the Christian understanding of suffering is that not all religious suffering is inner suffering.  In Christianity, some external suffering can also be regarded as religious suffering. What is important in the Christian understanding of suffering is whether that suffering comes from the conflict between faith and the world.[37] For, according to the Christian, as Marie Thulstrup rightly observes, "[the] real 'dying unto the world' [which is regarded by Climacus as the fundamental expression of religious suffering] occurs only by virtue of faith and grace."[38] Absolutely inner suffering is thus the second characteristic of the pathos of Religiousness A. 

     The third characteristic of Religiousness A is guilt, which is the decisive expression for existential pathos.(CUP, p. 526) "Recollection’s eternal storing up of guilt," says Climacus, "is the expression for existential pathos, the highest expression, even higher than the most inspired penance wants to make up for the guilt."(CUP, p. 538)  As this quotation shows, guilt-consciousness is "the eternal recollecting of guilt."(CUP, p. 533) And in this eternal recollection of guilt, the person in Religiousness A "reflects upon the consciousness of guilt totally … "(CUP, p.553) That is, he does not think of guilt as something comparative and momentary. In this way, for the person in Religiousness A, guilt is something which is inescapably related to his "being" itself. Guilt-consciousness is an expression of his limitations, finiteness, or his consciousness of the discrepancy between the finite and the infinite within himself. (Cf. CUP, p. 268) Provided that one has some sense of religiousness, one can discover one is guilty; one can have guilt-consciousness by oneself. In brief, guilt-consciousness “still lies essentially in immanence”. (CUP, p. 532) In contrast, "the consciousness of sin [in Christianity] is the paradox, and about this, the paradox is again very consistent, that the existing person does not discover it by himself but gets to know it from outside. The identity is thereby broken."(CUP, p. 534n)[39] Hence, from the perspective of Religiousness A, it is a strange idea that one is totally sinful, as the Christian asserts. What the person in Religiousness A can accept is that he is limited and finite, so he needs to be dependent. This is expressed as guilt-consciousness.

Up to now, we have examined the characteristics of the pathos of Religiousness A.  According to our examination, the person in Religiousness A is the one who totally resigns every external and immediate thing, and shows religiousness as incognito. He suffers from the insecurity of his God-relationship.[40] And he very definitely feels that he is limited and finite. As we anticipated when we started this discussion, we can now clearly see that what is important in Religiousness A is only the religious relation itself, not the object of this relationship. Perhaps, this is because for those who are in Religiousness A, God is no longer an object to which they should relate, but is immediately related to themselves. In this sense Robert L. Perkins is quite right when he says as follows: “The Climacan individual rejects dogmatic religious views and also totalizing, absolute systems…. The subjective thinker is a radically modified edition of a modern individual, … and certainly not the non-subject brought into focus by the postmodernism.”[41] Here is the profile of the subjective individual who is in the realm of Socratic religion (Religiousness A).

(3)

In this sense, Schleiermacher's religious person may be indicated as the case in point. Let us, therefore, turn to Schleiermacher in order to understand better what Religiousness A may be and why it is so different from what Kierkegaard understands by Christianity.

      According to Schleiermacher, as is well-known, the religious person is the one who has the consciousness of being absolutely dependent. And this "feeling of absolute dependence becomes a clear self-consciousness."[42] To make this discussion of Schleiermacher comprehensible, I shall make some general comment on Schleiermacher's use of these expressions, before going deeply into the main discussion of Schleiermacher's conception of one's relation to God.

      Firstly, when I use the term "the feeling of absolute dependence" as the translation of the German phrase "das schlechthinnige Abhaengigkeitsgefuehl" or "das Gefuehl der schlechthinnigen Abhaengigkeit", I am aware that there are other suggestions of the translation of this German phrase, e. g., "the feeling of unconditional dependence"[43], or "the feeling of utter (or simple) dependence"[44]. However, I think it is allowable to use the traditional translation of this German phrase, insofar as one clearly bears in mind the different nuances of these translations.  

     Secondly, in relation to this phrase, I am also aware that here "feeling" should not be understood in a merely subjective, psychological sense[45]; Schleiermacher's "feeling" may be understood as "cognitive feeling".[46] Here it will be worthwhile to quote a sentence from Richard R. Niebuhr: "When, in The Christian Faith, Schleiermacher says that feeling is an abiding-in-self, in distinction from knowing and doing, he does not mean that feeling is an empty passivity of the self: rather it 'is the universal form of having the self'."[47] So Schleiermacher's term "feeling" must be understood positively and broadly, not negatively nor psychologically in the restricted sense of the word.

    Thirdly, for Schleiermacher, the consciousness of absolute dependence has in itself the consciousness of freedom as well. For, in his thought, "without any feeling of freedom a feeling of absolute dependence would not be possible."[48] In our discussion of Schleiermacher's conception of one's relation to God (which we are going to deal with now), we should bear in mind these three points. 

     For Schleiermacher, this consciousness of being absolutely dependent is equated with the consciousness of being in relation to God.[49] For, according to Schleiermacher, "God is given to us in feeling in an original way"[50], and therefore, as Avis says, "the consciousness of God is given in and with the sense of absolute dependence."[51] Or, as Moltmann expresses: "God is indirectly experienced in the experience of the absolute dependency of our own existence."[52]

     The self-consciousness of the religious person is the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, and this self-consciousness includes God-consciousness "in such a way that...the two cannot be separated from each other." So his God-consciousness is exactly this feeling of absolute dependence. As long as one has this feeling of absolute dependence, one has God-consciousness. "So that in the first instance," says Schleiermacher, "God signifies for us simply that which is the co-determinant in this feeling and to which we trace our being in such a state...."[53] Shmueli makes a similar point when he explains Religiousness A: "He [the God of Religiousness A] is the expression of the religious feelings man acquires as soon as he comes to realize the finiteness of the human condition and opens himself toward what lies beyond it."[54] 

      The God-consciousness is sometimes called by Schleiermacher piety. According to Schleiermacher, "piety appears as a surrender, a submission to be moved by the Whole that stands over against man....So everybody who very definitely feels that he is finite and limited can have guilt-consciousness. Piety does, indeed, linger with satisfaction on every action that is from God, and every activity that reveals the Infinite in the finite, and yet it is not itself this activity."[55] Based upon this understanding of piety, Schleiermacher can describe the contemplation of the pious, and religion in the following way:

The contemplation of the pious is the immediate consciousness of the universal existence of all finite things, in and through the Infinite, and of all temporal things in and through the Eternal. Religion is to seek this and find it in all that lives and moves, in all growth and change, in all doing and suffering. It is to have life and to know life in immediate feeling, only as such an existence in the Infinite and the Eternal.... Wherefore it is a life in the infinite nature of the Whole, in the One and in the All, in God, having and possessing all things in God, and God in all.[56]

Yet this piety, or God-consciousness is neither knowledge nor morality. "Piety," says Schleiermacher, "cannot be an instant craving for a mess of metaphysical and ethical crumbs."[57] But this does not mean that for Schleiermacher, piety (or religion) lacks cognitive and moral implications. However, referring to this state, one may say that God has not yet been definitely conceptualized in the God-consciousness at first. As Barth says: "Piety as a determination of the self-consciousness precedes pious ideas."[58] (But afterwards, this religious person draws out the concept of God from his God-consciousness. This analysing and interpreting the God-consciousness is suggested as the task of theology. So Christian doctrines are defined as "accounts of the Christian religious affections set forth in speech"[59], and Dogmatics as "the knowledge of doctrine now current in the [evangelical] church."[60] In this sense, for Schleiermacher, theology is a descriptive, empirical, and even "phenomenological"[61] discipline; and one's statements about God are only statements about the manner in which the feeling of absolute dependence is to be related to God. Theological statements are only implications of the religious self-consciousness. In this sense, H. Richard Niebuhr says that for Schleiermacher, "God and faith belong together."[62] In short, for Schleiermacher, all the statements we make about God are expressions of our immediate consciousness of absolute dependence.[63]) 

      Therefore, what is important in religion is God-consciousness itself which has not yet been conceptualized. To put this in the language of Climacus, as long as one is related to deity (whoever he may be), one has the God-relationship, and therefore, in this relation to deity, one becomes oneself. However, strangely enough, Schleiermacher's God appears as One who cannot allow us think of Him in the way in which the one who is in the traditional Christianity thinks about God. For, when we closely look at Schleiermacher's God, we have to say, with Robert C. Roberts, that "the God of the Bible and traditional Christianity...cannot be the [God] for this feeling of [absolute dependence]."[64] 

      In relation to this God, there is guilt-consciousness, the consciousness of the difference between God and man. But there is no need of sin-consciousness as understood in Kierkegaard's Christianity. Such sin-consciousness is regarded as a terrible distortion of man's image. It is true that Schleiermacher, unlike the person who is described by Kierkegaard as being in Religiousness A, uses the term “sin-consciousness”. But the meaning which Schleiermacher gives to this term is similar to the guilt-consciousness in Kierkegaard's writings. For example, Schleiermacher says: "We are conscious of sin as the power and work of a time when the disposition to the God-consciousness had not yet actively emerged in us."[65] In this way, sin is discussed by Schleiermacher in terms of a weakness of the God-consciousness, or lower level of receptivity to divine influence.[66] And this weakening and defilement of the God-consciousness is understood to be due to our lower nature, the flesh. So, for Schleiermacher, as for the person in Religiousness A of Kierkegaard's writings, sin is a problem innate in the very self-structure of man. On the basis of this understanding, we can agree with Tillich when he says that in Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin, Schleiermacher follows the general trend of German idealism and certainly of the Enlightenment. He continues:

According to this trend, sin is a shortcoming. It is not a "no" but a "not yet". Sin arises because of the discrepancy between the great speed of the  evolutionary process in the biological development of mankind and the slower  pace of moral and spiritual development of man....Sin is the "not yet" of  man's spiritual development within an already fully developed bodily  organism. The distance or the gap between these two processes is what we call sin. This condition is universal. It is the state of mankind universally.... This makes sin in some way necessary and unavoidable.[67]

Hence Schleiermacher says that sin "does not invalidate the idea of the original perfection of man."[68] Schleiermacher says again that "sin is so little an essential part of being of man that we can never regard it as anything else than a disturbance of nature."[69] As Barth says, Schleiermacher's "dogmatics knows nothing of any sickness unto death."[70] 

     Consequently, Schleiermacher's conception of redemption and salvation is also different from that of Kierkegaard's Christianity. According to Schleiermacher, as Tillich quite clearly summarizes him, salvation is "the transformation of a limited, inhibited, or distorted religious consciousness into a fully developed religious consciousness", [or] "the liberation of our consciousness from inhibition, limitation and distortion"[71], or shortly "the presence of God in man, in man's consciousness ...."[72] Hence he who has this fully developed religious consciousness is one who has been saved. In this sense, we can agree with Barth when he says: "The antithesis of his second part [the antithesis of sin and grace] is a psychological one and therefore it falls short of the Christian antithesis at least in the New Testament and Reformation sense."[73] For, according to Schleiermacher, there is no need of vicarious sacrifice of Christ, no redemption in the classic and Reformation sense of these words.[74] In fact, in the thought-system of Schleiermacher, this traditional understanding of redemption is not necessary, or is even regarded as a misunderstanding or distortion of religious consciousness. Likewise, for Schleiermacher, there is no need of repentance and conversion in the traditional sense of these words.[75]

     For, in the final analysis, for Schleiermacher, there is a kind of continuity between man and God[76], and therefore, it is natural for man to have God-consciousness. In this sense, Schleiermacher says that "as certainly as Christ was a man, there must reside in human nature the possibility of taking up the divine into itself, just as did happen in Christ."[77] In the same spirit, he says again:

Inasmuch...as the reason is completely one with the divine Spirit, the divine Spirit can itself be conceived as the highest enhancement of the human reason, so that the difference between the two is made to disappear.[78]

But this does not mean that Schleiermacher equated God with every individual man. In the thought of Schleiermacher, God is regarded as the one who encompasses all human beings and all creatures. In this sense, Schleiermacher asserts that we cannot attribute a nature to God. That is, there is no such thing as the nature of God; God is "the unconditioned and the absolutely simple."[79] God is the reality that corresponds to the religious person's feeling of absolute dependence. He is regarded as the universal Source {"the Whence"} of all creatures and as the absolute causality.[80] So, according to him, God is in them (i. e., human beings and all creatures), among them, with them, behind them, and above them. God is the depth of everything, and the power of the divine is present in everything so that God is the ground and unity of everything. But He is always in relation to them and He works only through them.

     From this understanding, Schleiermacher can say that "[your] feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of the operation of God in you by means of the operation of the world upon you."[81] So, for the early Schleiermacher, God is equated with the Universe, the Whole.[82] A surrender to God is thus the surrender to the Universe. But this does not mean that the early Schleiermacher equates God and the world. In relation to this subject, we can agree with Richard B. Brandt, when he says:

The situation is roughly as follows: Schleiermacher clearly did not believe that God is an individual self-conscious being, capable of distinguishing Himself from the world. On the other hand, he continually insists upon a distinction between God and the world.[83]

For Schleiermacher himself says: "The world does not allow of being completely conceived [as totality and unity] except in and with God, and there is no other revelation of God than the world."[84] There is a clear continuity between God and the world; but both particular things in the world and the totality of particular things are not God. God is not the sum of all particulars, for, as Welch says, "the totality of finite things must also be viewed as utterly [absolutely] dependent."[85] God is opposite in kind and equal in scope to the world.[86] And yet, at the same time, for Schleiermacher, God is not an object beside other objects.[87] For Schleiermacher, to ascribe personality to God understood as the universal Source and the absolute Causality, "would be to reduce Him...to the level of finite," as Mackintosh says.[88] From this understanding of the relationship between God and the world, we may term Schleiermacher's thought "panentheism".[89] For Schleiermacher, the religious persons "refer everything to the Unchangeable and in all things alike perceive the Deity."[90] Yet, for the human being, "[humanity] itself is...the true universe, and the rest is only added in so far as it is related to it or forms its surroundings."[91] Thus, in the final analysis, God is equated with the Eternal Humanity which "is unweariedly active, seeking to step forth from its inward, mysterious existence into the light, and to present itself in the most varied way, in the fleeting manifestation of the endless life."[92] From this understanding Schleiermacher can assert: "All that is human is holy, for all is divine."[93] Moreover, there is a continuity between one's humanity and God as the eternal Humanity. Everybody lies "directly on the bosom of the infinite world. In that moment, [one is] its soul. Through one part of [one's] nature [one feels], as [one's] own, all its powers and its endless life."[94] Therefore,

[the more] everyone approaches the Universe and the more they communicate to one another, the more perfectly they all become one.... They are no longer men, but mankind also. Going out of themselves and triumphing over themselves, they are on the way to true immortality and eternity.[95]

In short, there is no transcendent God, for Schleiermacher. To think of God, says Schleiermacher, "as if apart from His operation upon us through the world, the existence of God before the world, and outside the world, though for the world, were ... vain mythology."[96] Schleiermacher's God is immanent (in the world).[97]

     This conception of God as a completely immanent deity also influences Schleiermacher's understanding of Christ.[98][91] In the next few paragraphs I shall consider this. For Schleiermacher, Christ's role is quite compatible with the progressive improvement of human nature.  For Christ is regarded merely as the supreme example of the one who is filled with God-consciousness. As is well-known, Christ is suggested only as the ideal of the "religious person" in his sense of the word. 

     According to Schleiermacher, in the life of Christ "the perfect form of God-consciousness lies in front of the human race" and this is the conclusive significance of Christ. Christ is suggested as having perfect ideality in relation to the God-consciousness; "we must conclude that ideality is the only appropriate expression for the exclusive personal dignity of Christ."  In this sense, he can criticize the view which attributes only an exemplary (vorbildliche) dignity to Christ, but not "ideality (Urbildlichkeit) (which, properly, asserts the existence of the concept itself), that is, absolute perfection".[99] But when Schleiermacher says that Christ is ideal, he does not mean that what Christ taught His disciples is the final ideality which does not have imperfection. Nor does he mean that Christ's actions are always perfect.[100] Especially at the earlier stage of Christ's life, sin was "certainly actually present" in Him, "even if only in the faintest degree".[101] Yet Schleiermacher thinks that in spite of sin in His life one can assert the sinlessness of Christ.[102] So here we can ask whether he shows that he uses this concept "sinlessness" in his own way, rather than in the traditional sense of the word; or whether he is inconsistent. In relation to this question, we should remember that Schleiermacher's conception of sin is different from the traditional sense of the word. Accordingly, his conception of "sinlessness" is also far removed from the traditional sense of the word. Barth notices this point and says that for Schleiermacher, "sinlessness is no more than human nature completely permeated by the divine."[103] Moreover, according to Schleiermacher, Christ must not be omniscient, for "this ... would mean the loss of true humanity."[104] Only in Christ's inner being is there absolute ideality, and "inner being may always transcend its manifestation."[105] And this ideality in Christ's inner being can be explained "only by the universal source of spiritual life in virtue of a creative divine act in which, as an absolute maximum, the conception of man as the subject of the God-consciousness comes to completion."[106] 

     Therefore, the reason why Christ can have the absolute ideality lies in the fact that human nature itself has the possibility of arriving at the peak of God-consciousness. So "what is peculiar in the Redeemer's kind of activity belongs to a general aspect of human nature."[107] In another place, he says:

[If] personal immortality did not belong to human nature, no union of the Divine Essence with human nature to form such a personality as that of the Redeemer would have been possible; and conversely, ... since God had determined to perfect and redeem human nature through such union, human individuals must all along have possessed the same immortality as the Redeemer was conscious of.[108]

Hence Christ's being the Redeemer partly owes to the peculiarity of human nature and its possibility of receiving the divine. Human nature is thus understood as having the capability of receiving divinity. So Schleiermacher says that "in so far as Christ none the less was also a perfectly human person, the formation of this person also must have been an act of the human nature"[109], even though there was also "the creative divine activity".[110]

     In this sense, Schleiermacher can say that Christ "is like all men in virtue of the identity of human nature, but distinguished from them all by the constant potency of His God-consciousness, which was a veritable existence of God in Him."[111] So, for Schleiermacher, to ascribe to Christ an absolutely powerful God-consciousness, and to attribute to Him "an existence of God in Him" are exactly the same thing. It is true that he admits that as far as we remain passive in our God-consciousness, there is no existence of God in any individual, but only an existence of God in the world.[112] Only when God-consciousness is in one's self-consciousness "as continually and exclusively determining every moment" and consequently also this perfect indwelling of the Supreme Being is one's peculiar being and one's inmost self, is one's God-consciousness "an existence of God in one". And Schleiermacher thinks that this applies only to the case of Christ. So he says:

[The] existence of God in the Redeemer is posited as the innermost fundamental power within Him, from which every activity proceeds and which holds every element together; everything human (in Him) forms only the organism for this fundamental power, and is related to it as the system which both receives and represents it, just as in us all other powers are related to the intelligence.[113]

     But according to Schleiermacher, one should not think that the divine in Christ is "something special existing from eternity, its descent to earth takes on the appearance of a humiliation."[114] That is, as Avis suggests, the deity of Christ cannot be stated in ontological terms, for that would have no meaning for Christian consciousness of God.[115] For as we have seen, the existence of God in Christ is only another expression of his absolutely powerful God-consciousness. We may thus agree with Barth when he says:

He [Schleiermacher] renounced the idea of a purely speculative christology, but precisely in so doing, according to the premises of his conception of religion, he was bound to renounce the idea of the Deity of Christ or, to put it differently, to understand the Deity of Christ as the incomparable climax and decisive stimulator within the composite life of humanity.[116]

So in relation to Christ, the being of God in his life "cannot be explained by its origin from a virgin without sexual intercourse."[117] "Therefore," says Schleiermacher again, "all ingenious explanations as to why this activity [virgin birth] is attributed specially to the Holy Spirit are out of place."[118] Schleiermacher understands Christmas, as Barth describes, in the following way:

It is the true existence of man himself as this is most purely and beautifully depicted in the relation of mother and child; it is the feeling for life which is kindled by seeing this relation, which is elevated by the feast, and which lovingly seeks and finds fellowship.[119]

For him, not only the miracle of the incarnation, but also miracle in general "cannot but be altogether superfluous."[120] Therefore, according to him, the virgin birth, the resurrection and ascension, and the prediction of his return in Judgment cannot be proper parts of Christianity.[121] Hence Schleiermacher tried to "offer, or better, point out a few alternatives" through his dogmatics.[122]

     Although he denies all "supernatural" elements (in the traditional sense of  the word) in relation to "the existence of God in Christ", there is a very fundamental question as to why Schleiermacher thinks that only in Christ is there special existence of God. For, if one thinks with the perspective and presupposition of Schleiermacher's thought, then it seems that there would be no basis on which one could assert that only in the case of Christ is His God-consciousness the same as "an existence of God in Him". In spite of this, Schleiermacher asserts that only in Christ was there the existence of God and in this sense Christ is different from us all. In our case "Christ in us is the centre of our life"[123], and "we see God in Christ, and envisage Christ as the most immediate partaker in the eternal love which sent Him forth and fitted for His task."[124] So there are some people who see this aspect of Schleiermacher's thought (i. e., his Christological emphasis) as being inconsistent with other aspects of his thought. For example, Barth says that "it [Schleiermacher's Christology] is the point where the system involuntarily breaks up."[125] Emil Brunner, in his book on Schleiermacher, also says that Schleiermacher's Christological thinking is an interlude in his dogmatics; it does not fit the whole system.[126] B. A. Gerrish summarizes Brunner's argument in the following way:

In Truth, so it is claimed, his dogmatics really falls apart [into] two systems; and Brunner knows which belongs to the real Schleiermacher (the mystical) and which is only an intrusion (the Christian). The word about Christ, which certainly requires a conceptual awareness of him, is a mere disturbance.[127]

Even though there are some problems with their interpretations of Schleiermacher, I basically agree with them in their suspicion of Schleiermacher's inconsistence in relation to his Christological emphasis.

     But even in Schleiermacher, the difference between us and Christ is only a difference of degree, not of kind.[128] Schleiermacher says that "the distinction between the Redeemer and us others is established in such a way that, instead of being obscured and powerless as in us, the God-consciousness in Him was absolutely clear and determined each moment, to the exclusion of all else...."[129] So although Schleiermacher uses the expression, "in the Redeemer God became man", and the Johannine phrase "the Word became flesh", he uses these expressions in his own way.  For example, with regard to the Johannine phrase, he says that "'Word' is the activity of God expressed in the form of consciousness, and 'flesh' is a general expression for the organic."[130] In this sense, as Niels Thulstrup says, according to Schleiermacher, "[in] Christ the God-consciousness conquered completely, but this indicates a change in quantity, not in quality."[131] To say that "in the Redeemer God became man", for Schleiermacher, is to say that we have in Christ a human nature saturated with the perfect consciousness of God. Therefore, for Schleiermacher, there is no essential difference between Christ and other human beings. In this sense, Schleiermacher, in the Christmas Eve, can make Ernst say: "[Every] mother is another Mary. Every mother has an eternal divine child and devoutly seeks the stirrings of the higher spirit within."[132] Similarly, according to Schleiermacher, not only Christ's suffering, but "all suffering, even on the part of one who is only relatively innocent, always has a vicarious character."[133]

     Hence, in the thought of Schleiermacher, there is no Incarnation in the traditional sense of the word.[134] Barth makes a similar point when he says: "Schleiermacher's Christology has as its summit the indication of a quantitative superiority, dignity and significance in Christ as opposed to our own Christianity."[135] It is not only critical scholars like Barth who hold this view, but also sympathetic admirers (of Schleiermacher) like Heinrich Scholz. Scholz says: "The basis of his picture of Christ is...the evolutionary view of history given an idealistic sign, and therefore the best scholarship of his age."[136] For Schleiermacher, "[the] beginning of His [Christ's] life was...a new implanting of the God-consciousness which creates receptivity in human nature"[137], or more precisely, "the perfecting of human nature."[138] However, for Schleiermacher, this receptivity and God-consciousness was already present in humanity itself.  For, without this receptivity there cannot be any exertion even of Christ's influence and one cannot experience any change through Christ. "For there can be no change," says Schleiermacher, "in a living being without his own activity; hence, without such activity - that is, in a purely passive way - no influence exerted by another can really be received."[139] Thus there are two factors in relation to the work of Christ which may be termed a new implanting of the God-consciousness: the influence of Christ's consciousness of God and man's innate receptivity.[140] Only when there is the working of these two factors, is there any positive result.[141] Schleiermacher thus always presupposes that there is man's receptivity which plays its own role in the process of having relationship with God. So he says that "the indwelling being of God in Him [Christ] must be related to the whole human nature in the same way as that which previously was innermost was related to the whole human organism".[142] Only on the basis of this understanding can he speak of "the beginning of the life of Jesus as the completed creation of human nature", or "its second creation" or "the regeneration of the human race."[143] Hence, as Thulstrup says, according to Schleiermacher, "[Christ's] appearance in history signifies nothing supernatural, no break with the continuity of nature."[144] Indeed, Schleiermacher writes:

The appearance of the first man constituted at the same time the physical life of the human race; the appearance of the Second Adam constituted for this nature a new spiritual life, which communicates and develops itself by spiritual fecundation. And as in the former its originality (which is the condition of the appearance of human nature) and its having emerged from creative divine activity are the same thing, so also in the Redeemer both are the same - His spiritual originality, set free from every prejudicial influence of natural descent, and that existence of God in Him which also proves itself creative.[145]

Hence, for Schleiermacher, it is not that there is an independent God who is outside of this process, and that this God constitutes firstly the physical nature of man, and secondly, the spiritual nature of man. God is understood by Schleiermacher to be in this process itself, and therefore the originality of these constitutions is understood as their having emerged from creative divine activity. So he says:

[Christ] has part in our blessedness or salvation only through His influence upon this progressive improvement, which means that a specific difference between Him and other men is of little importance.[146]

Therefore, what happens in Christ conditioned humanity in general.[147]  So we may agree with Barth when he says:

They [Christ and other people] are mediated by means of their belonging together in the comprehensive composite phenomenon of the higher life. At some point or other they must coincide. And it is only with the prospect of this final coincidence and from this point of no distinction that they are distinguished at all.[148]

Therefore, it is natural for Barth to conclude: "To be sure, one cannot seriously speak of an absoluteness of Christ in Schleiermacher, but one can certainly speak of a supreme relativity which was most incisively maintained and which was tirelessly established [throughout his life] with both brilliance and warmth".[149] 

      Schleiermacher's understanding of the Church and the Holy Spirit is presented in a similar way. That is, the Church is the realm in which the power of Christ's God-consciousness is communicated immanently in history. The Holy Spirit is even said to mean "the [living] unity of the Christian [community] as a moral personality" or the "common spirit" of the Church, which is at the same time "the being of God in it."[150] And, according to Schleiermacher, there is no such thing as eternal damnation of some people, and "there will one day be a universal restoration of all souls."[151]  

     Based on the discussion developed so far, we may say that Schleiermacher has nothing to do with transcendence in the traditional sense of the word.[152] To conclude, Schleiermacher's God is immanent and his Christ's role is quite compatible with the progressive improvement of human nature.

(4)

So far we have seen the general characteristic of Religiousness A. We started with the possibility of a non-Christian interpretation of The Sickness unto Death. We then related this non-Christian theistic religiousness to the "Socratic" of Climacus. Then, we have considered Schleiermacher's theology and Christology in order to see a clear example of this kind of religiousness. What we have seen is that for Religiousness A God is immanent in the world. Of course, there are some people in Religiousness A who speak of a kind of transcendence. However, that transcendence either has no real relation to this realm of time and space or that transcendence is only immanent transcendence. In the case of the absolutely transcendent God being unable to enter into this realm of time and space, God has nothing to do with this realm of time and space. So in the realm of time and space, man himself is sovereign. Yet this sovereign man may have something of the feeling of total dependence, but this feeling does not affect the realm of reason in which he is still sovereign. He is dependent on God in the realm beyond that of reason. His God does not touch the realm of reason at all. In this sense, this man's transcendence becomes the immanent transcendence. 

     So there is, in Religiousness A, no room for the God who is both transcendent and can enter into the realm of time and space. God becomes either the God of absolute transcendence, who cannot enter into the realm of time and space and the realm of reason, or the God of immanence, of panentheism. The God to whom the person in Religiousness A relates is such a God. So for this person, the God-man has nothing to do with his becoming himself. Without the God-man, he can well relate himself to his God, and therefore become himself. This is very clear in the case of Schleiermacher. As Barth says: "Schleiermacher turns the Christian relationship of man with God into an apparent human possibility."[153] In contrast to Religiousness A, Kierkegaard's Christian thinks as follows:

[A] Mediator is necessary for [him], among other reasons, simply to make [him] aware that it is God with whom, as we say, [he has] the honor of speaking; otherwise a man can easily live on in the indolent conceit that he is talking with God, whereas he is only talking with himself.(JP, II,  1424(Pap. X 4 A 252))

Hence, says Kierkegaard again, "one's wanting to be related to God without a mediator" shows one's untruth.(JP, IV, 4517(Pap. X 4 A 577))

     From this (consideration) we can draw out the conclusion that the difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in Religiousness A conclusively lies in the difference between their Gods, or their conception of God. This is the reason why Kierkegaard sometimes clearly differentiates the god whom the pagan thinks of and worship and the Christian’s God.[154] If one is known by the Christian God, and believes by this God's revelation that the Christian God is transcendent but yet He can enter into the realm of time and space and the realm of reason, one inevitably thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to this God who reveals Himself through the God-man. But, on the other hand, if one thinks that God is so absolutely transcendent that He cannot enter into the realm of time and space and of reason, one naturally thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to God, a relation which is neither in the realm of time and space. In a similar way, if one thinks that God is only immanent, one naturally thinks that one can be oneself only in relation to this immanent God, a relation which must be expressed in an immanent way, e. g., one's relation to another person and other creatures.[155] Hence, in the theology of Schleiermacher, the religious community is strongly emphasized. We can thus see a clear correlation between one's conception of God and one's understanding of becoming a self.

     Let us here ask one more question: what makes the difference between the Christian's conception of God and the conception of God of the person in Religiousness A?  Fundamentally, the reason why the Christian thinks of God in the way described above lies in the revelation of God through the God-man. Face to face with the phenomenon of the God-man, the Christian accepts this phenomenon as that of revelation, and in accepting this he abandons the presuppositions of the natural man, which he had in common with the ethical person and the person in Religiousness A.  However, the person in Religiousness A does not want to abandon such presuppositions, so he develops his own conception of God which is compatible with his presuppositions as a natural man. So the fundamental difference between the Christian and the person in Religiousness A lies in the question of whether or not one has abandoned the presuppositions of the natural man. (We shall consider the point more carefully in the next chapter of this study.)  Here is the very reason why Religiousness A is quite compatible with the ethical sphere, whereas Christianity is quite incompatible with the ethical sphere. For as Henriksen correctly observes, “as long as the teleology is immanent, and not linked to the incarnation and what is given by it, the constitution of subjectivity will be marked by sin.”[156]

<Abstract>

Becoming a self in Religiousness A in contrast to Becoing a Self in Religiousness B

I show in this paper that the Christian’s understanding of becoming a self is quite different from that of the person in Religiousness A. Schleiermacher’s religious person can be regarded as a representative one who is in Religiousness A. The basic difference between Kierkegaard’s Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in Religiousness A lies in the characteristics of God to whom each relates in his relation to himself. In other words, the God of the Christian is different from the God of Religiousness A, and this difference plays the major role in defining the difference between the Christian's understanding of becoming a self and that of the person in Religiousness A. I also show the difference between their views of one's relationship to God, and the difference between guilt-consciousness which the person in Religiousness A has and sin-consciousness which the Christian has. I make this point by showing the compatibility of Kierkegaard’s Religiousness A to Schleiermacher’s religion.

In the end, we have seen that as long as one keeps the characteristics of the ethical sphere, one's understanding of becoming a self is far from the Christian understanding.  For the Christian's relation to God, which is vital for his becoming himself, is regarded by the ethical person and the person in ‘Religiousness A’ as being particularistic, anti-rationalistic, and heteronomous. According to the Christian himself, however, one's relation to God is the most important thing which is demanded by God from everybody, and which allows one's real freedom.